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half of the analytic/synthetic dichotomy untouched. 
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 In the 1950’s, W.V.O. Quine published what he thought was a crippling blow to the 
analytic/synthetic distinction. Hailed as one of the most important philosophical articles in the 
20th century, the “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” sought to demonstrate how the concept of 
analyticity is circular in nature. The conclusions that Quine drew from this argument envisioned 
the collapse of reductionism and, subsequently, the verification theory. Both were theories central 
to the logical positivists whose hard-nosed doctrine dominated Anglo-American philosophy for 
much of early 20th Century. Although it has attracted criticism and praise, the article has held a 
profound influence in Western philosophy.  
 Unfortunately, the article is flawed in the same manner the author critiques analyticity and 
the two doctrines following in its wake: the “Two Dogmas” is dogmatic itself. Quine’s essay 
strictly holds to ideas and claims that are clearly not true, highly contested, or preposterous. This 
article’s first critique exposes two major dogmatisms cleverly embedded under the superficial 
and swift analysis. Readers are required to agree with Quine on the assertion that all definitions 
are synonyms. This ignores axiological components of the relationship between them as well as 
demand agreement with the Cluster theory of naming. The second dogmatism is the blatant 
ignorance of two extremely conflicting theories of meaning (logical positivist and ordinary 
language philosophy) that is embodied in his dual categories of analyticity. For Quine to bridge 
the gap between the theories and ground analyticity, what he really did was set up an impossible 
task of needing to conform one theory of meaning to another. The third dogmatism that Quine, 
his followers and his critics are guilty of is the avoidance of syntheticity, thereby leaving the 
other half of the analytic/synthetic dichotomy untouched.  
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Quine’s “Two Dogmas” and Popular Commentaries 
 Readers unfamiliar with the work in under attack will benefit from a brief restatement of 
Quine’s central argument and several popular rebuttals to the article as well, for concepts within 
the rebuttals will appear again in the counter-arguments present in this essay. In beginning his 
examination into analyticity, Quine identifies two kinds of analytic statements. The first form 
consists of statements that are logically true. He offers the example of “no unmarried man is 
married.” What is unique about the logical form is that “it not merely is true as it stands, but 
remains true under any and all reinterpretations of 'man' and 'married.'” The statement is true not 
due to the meaning of the words but by the presence of the logical particles.1 Without 
consideration to the meanings for “married” or “man,” the sentence is true regardless. Because of 
the presence and structure generated by logical particles such as “un” and “no,” philosophers are 
assured that whatever statement fits the form will always ring true. What can be abstracted is a 
logical formulation that shows the structure of statements labeled analytic for the same reason. 
Any proposition that has the composition “No -Px is Px”  (where “P” stands for a predict and “x” 
takes the place of an object) must be classified as analytic. 
 The observant philosopher will recognize the framework of “No -Px is Px” as a 
manifestation of Aristotle's principle of contradiction (or sometimes called the law of non-
contradiction).2 In the Metaphysics, Aristotle established the principle as the follow: “For the 
same thing to be present and not be present at the same time in the same subject, and according 
                                                 
1 Quine, 22 
2 The presence of the principle of non-contradiction is not covered in Quine’s analysis of the subject-matter. 
Rather, this is a deeper analysis of the “Two Dogmas.”  
 4 
to the same, is impossible.”3 The law is easy enough to understand: it is logically impossible for 
same adjective or predicate to be simultaneously attributed and not attributed to a particular 
object at the same time. A man, by this principle, cannot be given simultaneously the property of 
married and unmarried. Immanuel Kant identified the link between analyticity and the principle 
when he wrote “all analytic judgements depend wholly on the principle of contradiction.”4 
Keeping this in mind, we can further boil down Quine’s structure of logical analyticity to a 
simpler and more symbolic formula: - x (Px & -Px). The jargon captures both the principle of 
non-contradiction and the logical analyticity in one fell swoop. Essentially, it reads that it is not 
the case that for all things “x” that it is “P” and not “P”.5 
 Not all analytic statements fit nicely into that framework. Propositions with largely 
different logical structures exist that are not of the form - x (Px & -Px). For instance, what about 
the proposition “Gold is a yellow metal”? Quine, as he did with his “bachelor” example, would 
switch out “gold” for its synonym “yellow metal” (why that is so will be explained shortly). 
Thus, the statement is now “Yellow metal is a yellow metal.” Obviously, it does not have the 
same logical structure as “No unmarried man is married.” What is present is a tautology: a 
statement that is unconditionally true. Abstracted from that is the logical formula “Px is Px” and 
boiled down even further to  x (Px & Px). 
 Essentially, both tautologies and the principle of non-contradiction are saying the same 
thing but differently. The law of non-contradiction says that an object x cannot have and not have 
a particular predicate. Tautologies state that if an object is assigned a particular predicate, then 
                                                 
3 Aristotle, 72 
4 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, 10  
5 Quantum physics be damned! Bizarre as the governing mechanics may be (the possibility of superpositions of 
elementary particles, for example), physicists argue where quantum systems give way to macroscopic views. In 
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it has assigned that particular predicate. Being a tautology means a statement is abiding by the 
law of non-contradiction. Why bother pointing out that similarity? The advantage of the principle 
of contradiction and tautologies is that it provides a sound and irrefutable base for analyticity. 
There is no need here to further glorify the principle of non-contradiction or tautologies. What 
matters is that is provides Quine an ideal platform for analyticity. 
The second kind of analytic statements are those such as “Gold is a yellow metal,” and 
“No bachelor is married.” A term to label these will be naturally analytic statements. Note that 
this does not mean there is an inherent property of analyticity within these statements; the label 
only refers to how such statements might be encountered through the natural discourse of 
language. Quine declares what makes natural forms analytic is because of their ability 
(theoretically) to be transformed into the logical kind. Ideally, the term “bachelor” could be 
swapped for “unmarried man” and, therefore, we are left with the proposition “No unmarried 
man is married” which is certainly the logical form via the principle of non-contradiction. 
Unfortunately, Quine is not satisfied with the second category of analytic statements. “We still 
lack a proper characterization of this second class of analytic statements,” writes Quine, “and, 
therewith analyticity generally, inasmuch as we have had in the above description to lean on a 
notion of ‘synonymy’ which is no less in need of clarification than analytic itself.”6 There is no 
characteristic of the naturally form that allows them to be classified as analytic. What connects 
the natural form to the logical form is synonymy. The term “synonymy” is one that Quine 
believes is misunderstood. Therefore, the fate of analyticity rests with a strong foundation 
requiring a firm grasp of synonymy. If synonymy cannot be described clearly, then analyticity 
must be tossed to the wind. 
                                                                                                                                                             
other words, the level to which humans operate allows the principle of contradiction to hold. 
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 A natural place to start an investigation into synonymy is with definitions. It dawns on 
Quine that “definition rests on synonymy rather than explaining it.” A definition, to Quine, is just 
a synonymous term. Consider the word “bachelor” and its definition “unmarried man.” No 
English speaker will deny the fact that these terms are synonymous of one another. “Bachelor” 
can, in nearly all situations, be replaced by the definition/synonym “unmarried man.” The nature 
of this relationship between definition and synonymy leads Quine to the conclusion that 
examining definitions is a dead end since definitions express synonymy rather than explaining it. 
7 Because of this feature, Quine quickly turns his attention back to synonymy. 
 Yet another undeniable feature of synonymous terms is their ability to replace one another 
without altering the truth-value of the sentences they appear in. Synonymous terms, obviously, 
have the ability to replace each other, but it is absurd to even suggest that two terms can replace 
one while changing the nature of the sentence from true to false. Identifying this feature, Quine 
writes: “The question remains whether interchangeability salva veritate8 (apart from occurrences 
within words) is a strong enough condition for synonymy, or whether, on the contrary, some 
heteronymous expressions might be thus interchangeable.”9 Thus the discussion has gone from 
being about synonymy to its dual characteristics: interchangeability and maintaining truth-value. 
This issue leads him to develop what he calls cognitive synonymy: the means to alter naturally 
analytic statements into the logical form.10 He sees interchangeability salva veritate (if possible) 
as the sufficient condition for cognitive synonymy. The investigation then turns towards finding 
what justifies (if there is justification of) cognitive synonymy. Quine proposes the statement 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 Quine, 23 
7 Quine, 26 
8 Salva veritate: “with unharmed truth,” a term coined by Leibniz 
9 Quine, 28 
10 Quine, 31 
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“Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors.” This statement is clearly true. Now, cognitive 
synonymy should dictate that the first instance of 'bachelors' is replaceable with 'unmarried men,' 
the resulting sentence being “Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried man.”11  
 There is, Quine argues, really nothing supporting that statement. In language, two 
synonymous words sometimes refer to the same object, like Frege's “morning star” and “evening 
star” both signify Venus. Being that “evening star” and “morning star” denote the same celestial 
body, the terms are in what we call extensional agreement. However, Quine writes the following: 
“There is no assurance here that the extensional agreement of 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' rests 
on meaning rather than merely on accidental matters of fact.” Simply because two names 
designate the same object does not guarantee that they are related in meaning. Because two 
entities may be described as either a bachelor or an unmarried man does not prove there is 
something inherent joining together those terms. An object might be describable by two words 
through purely accidental reasons. Quine’s example uses the descriptors “creature with a heart” 
and “creature with kidneys.” Sure, there are creatures where it is applicable to employ either 
label. Then again, having hearts and kidneys could be something that occurred purely by 
accident. For either phrase, nowhere in its meaning dictates that if a beast has a heart it will 
necessarily have kidneys, or vice versa. To state their meanings are indeed related demands an 
appeal to analyticity to establish a connection through meaning rather than by extensional, and 
potentially accidently, agreement.12 Accordingly, Quine concludes that the justification for 
analyticity is circular. Naturally analyticity must be rooted in the logical kind. The conversion 
needs an understanding of synonymy, which in turn relies on interchangeability salva veritate. 
That is the sufficient condition for cognitive synonymy. Yet that requires an appeal to analyticity 
                                                 
11 Quine, 29 
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to determine if two terms are actually synonymous rather than just accidentally related.  
 The author does provide an extra argument based in symbolic logical. But that case is not 
being criticized in this essay. All that will be mentioned is it stands as a counter-argument against 
those who may attempt to understand the nature of analyticity through a non-extensional 
language and semantical rules. Quine swiftly does away with that. 
 There are numerous responses to the “Two Dogmas.” Hilary Putnam in his article “Two 
Dogmas Revisited” praises the piece, though he believes that Quine’s objectives were skewed. 
Putnam states that Quine was attacking the logical positivists. His assault of analyticity was 
actually a fight against was aprioritcity: “the concept of a truth which is confirmed no matter 
what is not a concept of analyticity but a concept of aproritcity. Yet both Quine and the 
positivists did take this to be a concept of analyticity.” To put it briefly, the reason Putnam made 
the assertion was because the positivists thought a statement with a fixed range of confirming 
experiences is fixed in its meaning as well. Meaning-fixing is done by stipulation. Since a priori 
statements are true by meaning alone, the positivists determined analyticity followed from 
aprioricity since the former is true by meaning alone.13 
 Conversely, H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson offer a stunning critique of “Two Dogmas.” One 
reply was that Quine's thesis is more suited to the discussion if it attempted to confirm that the 
criteria for the analytic/synthetic distinction “are totally misunderstood by those who use the 
expression, that the stories they tell themselves about the differences are full of illusion.” For 
these authors, Quine's paper never definitively destroys the division; it merely points out the 
circularity of our present understanding even though those terms still have an “established 
                                                                                                                                                             
12  Quine, 31 
13  Putnam, 90-92 
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philosophical use.”14 Grice and Strawson maintain the analytic/synthetic distinction seeing that 
Quine only succeeded in shining light on the misunderstanding of it.  
A second counter-argument the duo writes states that “the distinction we suppose 
ourselves to be marking by the use of the expression 'means the same as,' 'does not mean the 
same as' does not exist either.” Either of those expressions are rewordings of synonymy. 
However, Quine “demonstrated” how ungrounded synonymy is. Grice and Strawson take that a 
step further and postulate that if words cannot be synonymous, then it is not logical to assume 
sentences can be synonymous also. If such is the case, then “it seems that talk of sentences 
having meaning at all must be meaningless too.” 15 In essence, the authors are taking Quine’s 
argument and running it to conclusions that cause the whole essay to appear incoherent, a classic 
reductio ad absurdum argument. 
 Another significant criticism of the “Two Dogmas” appears momentarily in John Searle's 
book Speech Acts. Searle asks the reader to consider the definition of analytic statements as any 
statement that begins with the letter “A”. Obviously, that is incorrect. Searle remarks this in 
regards to our ability to deduce obviously false definition when we lack a solid grasp of the 
subject:  
We know these things precisely because we know what the word 'analytic' means; further we could 
not know them if we did not know what 'analytic' means...our failure to find criteria of the 
purposed kind presupposes precisely that we do understand analyticity. We could not embark on 
our investigation if we did not understand the concept, for it is only in virtue of that understanding 
that we could assess the adequacy of proposed criteria.16  
Searle argues we do indeed know what analyticity means, otherwise how else would be able to 
determine incorrect from correct definitions? Or how else could an investigation even start? 
Quine, after all, did provide a fairly in-depth investigation for a concept he claimed was unclear. 
                                                 
14  Grice and Strawson, 143 
15  Grice and Strawson, 145-146 
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From his knowledge of analyticity, he was able to put forth such notions about it like the logical 
and natural forms, the importance of synonymy, and cognitive synonymy. It appears contradictory 
that Quine states that analyticity is unclear yet at the same time he abstracts all of these features 
about it. Nor could Quine even have begun his investigation.  
 
 
Notes to the Rebuttals 
 Before the rebuttals to Quine’s essay are to be explored, an essential point is needed to be 
made about them to avoid confusion. Althought these three rebuttals sometimes regard the same 
topic, or even seem to give rise to another, it must be mentioned that these are not to be taken as 
interrelated arguments supporting each another to form some single powerful critcism of the 
“Two Dogmas.” Each is written isolated from the other two. The first counter-argument, for 
instance, is not designed to confirm or supplement the others. Failing to ignore this will certainly 
give rise to some contradictions in the overall essay. The reader should, upon finishing a section, 
not carry on the arguments onto the next sections. Again, these should be seen as three 
individual, distinct and non-related arguments against Quine’s thesis. 
 
Shaky Foundations  
In the beginning of the essay, it was stated that there are parts left unexposed in regards to 
Quine’s thesis. The premises that he operates with in the “Two Dogmas” are such an area 
unexamined. Naturally, all philosophers write with some premises that the reader must accept, at 
least for the duration of the essay. In most situations, the majority of the audience generally 
                                                                                                                                                             
16  Searle, 7 
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accepts the premises. Quine’s premises, however, are not necessarily accepted by all of his 
readers. Actually, he never directly lays them out; the foundations are only brought to the surface 
through careful examination. Once the premises are exposed, it becomes apparent that the “Two 
Dogmas” only appeals to a very narrow selection of philosophers. 
 The appearance of the first premise arises when Quine discusses the relationship between 
definitions and synonyms. The relation he offers, unfortunately, is quite unclear. Quine writes that 
“definitions rests on synonymy rather than explaining it,” and that a definition “hinges on prior 
relations of synonym.” What is Quine expressing by saying that definitions “hinge” or “rest” on 
synonym? Two answers are possible. Either he means two terms are entirely reliant upon another 
insofar as the meaning of one depends greatly on the other and, thus, there exists a direct 
connection between words, or that their relation is partial and weaker. The second explanation 
simply does not work. If a synonym and a definition are not exactly connected with one another, 
then there exists some vagueness between them. Quine notices this and addresses it as follows: 
“not that synonyms so conceived need not even be free from vagueness, as long as the 
vaguenesses match.”17 Vagueness between terms is fine for Quine. It might be fine for others too 
if it were not for the fact that it is impossible to determine if vaguenesses match. A mechanism or 
theory must be in place in order to see if the vaguenesses are equal.  
Think about the different synonyms for the word “substitute.” Appropriate synonyms 
include terms like alternate, auxiliary, backup, fill-in, equivalent, surrogate, proxy, understudy, 
temporary expedient, reserve, and replacement. Assume, for sake of argument, that these terms 
all have some vagueness between them. For Quine to be correct, there must be equal vagueness 
between terms. The following question comes to mind: Do all of the synonyms need their 
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vagueness match against one another or does vagueness-matching count only between the word 
that is to be replaced with one of the synonyms? Quine is not clear about that. Answering either 
question leads to an absurd answer. If the first part of the question is the case, then that means 
that all words and their synonyms are in a “vagueness-stasis” with one another where vagueness 
is present but in an equal quantity between each term. If the other part is the case, then that 
requires one set of synonyms to hold the same vagueness and others not to hold to the same 
requirement. Yet there is no reason to suppose that the substitute-proxy pair must be of a 
particular vagueness whereas another pair such as substitute-understudy does not. Either of these 
conclusions beg the question of what is the means are to which vagueness can be measured. 
There exists no such theory or mechanism to detect is a synonym-pair is of equal or different 
vagueness.  
Because of the philosophical problems the supposition that there exists vagueness 
between definitions and synonyms, this leaves the conclusion that all definitions are directly 
related to synonyms. Two synonymous terms must be interchangeable without any vagueness 
between the two. This is the first major premise of Quine's article. Unfortunately, there are 
serious tribulations with it  
 An early edition of this article was presented at Pacific Univerisity’s Undergraduate 
Philosophy Conference in 2011. Whilst I was presenting the previous point, I mentioned this 
means that one can swap the term “Aristotle” with its definition “the student of Plato.” Amongst 
the sea of raised eyebrows, I corrected myself swiftly of the obvious blunder I made; Aristotle is 
typically refered to as the most famous student of Plato. Mulling over this later, I was hit with an 
ephiany: both defintions of Aristotle are correct; they only differ in the degree of how effective 
                                                                                                                                                             
17    Quine, 26-7, emphasis added 
 13 
the defintions signified to Aristotle. It is correct to called him the most famous student of Plato. 
However, it is equally correct to call him the student of Plato as well. The latter case just is 
inferior to the former about how easily Aristotle is referenced. 
 Here is a grave problem with Quine’s premise that all defintions are synonyms. In the 
claim, Quine is looking past how well a defintion/synonymy pair might refer. As with the above 
example, both defintions are true of Aristotle. Now, a counter-argument might be made to state 
that calling his simply “the student of Plato” does not actually point him out since there are many 
students of Plato. This is incorrect because referring is still done, it is just the effectiveness is 
low. Think about a conversation where someone brings up George Harrison. The interlocur 
unfamiliar with the name might ask who he is, and the response given might be “the Beatle.” In 
that scenario, there are others who can be classified as “the Beatle” as well. To use the descriptor 
excludes many others and leaves behind a total of four possible people who Harrison might be. A 
better, more efficent, descriptor of him would be “the Beatle who is the lead guitarist.” That 
directs the hearer to one specific person. 
 Now, this is not the time or place to establish some kind of definitional effiancy 
apparatus. The only true use would be to generate some sort of mechanism to demarcate the 
degree a defition/synonym pair effectively interact so they can be replaced by the others. Without 
an apparatus, however, it is still quite clear to the reader that in blindly accepting all definitions 
as synonymys is to ignore effectiveness, as shown in the Harrison/Beatle example. This is what 
troubles the first premise of the “Two Dogmas”: not every definition/synonym pair functions as 
well as others. Ergo, Quine is mistaken with this point. 
  What if someone, not seeing the difficulties exposed above, adhered to the belief that all 
definitions are synonyms? He would be led the adherent to the Cluster theory of naming: a theory 
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of naming the premise greatly compliment.  
  The Cluster theory maintains that for every proper name there are various properties 
which can name the intended thing. These properties, individually or with others, must be able to 
pick out the individual person or object. In Speech Acts, John Searle lays out the principles of the 
Cluster theory. As with the previous example involving Aristotle, any one of the descriptions of 
him are capable of naming him. Searle writes in regards to the description of Aristotle, that 
“though no single one of them is analytically true of Aristotle, their disjunction is.” What he 
means is because no description of Aristotle, like him being the teacher of Alexander or the most 
famous student of Plato, is the absolute identifying trait for Aristotle; many other characteristics 
refer to him equally as well. From the collection of possible traits, what is true about them is at 
least one will refer to Aristotle, hence that is was Searle means their disjunction is true of him. 
He goes on to further state this point by writing that “it is a necessary condition for an object to 
be Aristotle that it satisfy at least some of these descriptions.”18 
The Cluster theory, however, is not without its problems. Saul Kripke, in his Naming and 
Necessity, spends a lecture describing what he sees as the massive faults in the theory. A 
consequence stemming from the Cluster theory is the role necessity plays. Regarding the ways 
Aristotle may be described, he writes that “it just is not, in any intuitive sense of necessity, a 
necessary truth that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him.”19 To Kriple, there 
must be necessary components involved with naming otherwise attributing names is arbitrary. 
Aristotle did not have to do or be any of the things that he is commonly described as. There is 
nothing about Aristotle that required him to be the most famous student of Plato, teach 
Alexander, or write the Metaphysics. We can, using Leibniz's idea of possible worlds, imagine 
 15 
situations where Aristotle did not do any of those things. Yet in those possible worlds, we still 
call him Aristotle. At that point, Kripke offers his own theory of naming, known as the Causual 
theory. To put it quite briefly, Kripke states that once something is named, “an initial baptism 
takes place” where the name is fixed. From that moment on, “when the name is ‘passed from link 
to link,’ the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same 
reference as the man from whom he heard it.”20 Instead of names merely being the disjuction of 
possible descriptors, Kripke sees a causal connection from person to person. When a student 
learns the name “Aristotle,” he is referencing the person that his teacher is refering to, who is the 
person that his teacher is refering to, and that goes all the way back to Aristotle himself.  
What is the value in examining these conflicting theories of naming? It is clear that 
Quine’s writings within the “Two Dogmas” is far more compatible with the doctrine of the 
Cluster theory. However, that is no necessarily so with the Causual theory. Why this is so is due 
to the fact that a premise for the “Two Dogmas” is that all defintions can function as synonymys, 
thereby allowing for a theory of naming like the Cluster theory. This premise does not work with 
the Causual theory. Kripke certainly would argee that a synonym cannot simply replace a name. 
In fact, that was one of his criticiques of the Cluster theory. Therefore, Kripke’s Causal theory 
does not conform to a main premise in the “Two Dogmas.” An additional outcome of this is that 
it demonstrates that one cannot accept necessarily any non-Cluster theory of naming whilst 
agreeing with Quine. If a philosopher thought that Quine was right in the “Two Dogmas” and 
Kripke was correct with his Causal theory, then his beliefs would clash upon finding out that the 
latter does not operate well with the former. 
                                                                                                                                                             
18 Searle, 169   
19 Kripke, 74 
20   Kripke, 96  
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 A reply might certainly arise in stating that what has only been exposed is that the Causal 
theory is incompatible with the “Two Dogmas.” Certainly, for compatiblity between article and 
theory there will have to be some shared characteristics like of the relationship between definition 
and synonym. However, said counter-argument goes on, that does not mean Quine's piece is 
incompatible with many or all other theories of naming. Simply because a theory cannot conform 
perfectly to the premises does not discount there are other theories which do. 
 The above is a true concern. A philosophical leap of logic would be to assume that the 
definition/synonym premise of the “Two Dogmas” applies to only one reference theory and, 
therefore, requires readers with the particular view in order to agree with the conclusion. There 
are, though, other theories of reference that disagree with the Cluster theory and, thereby, 
disagrees with that presmise.  
 In Pragmatism and Reference, David Boersema describes his pragmatic theory of 
reference all the while attacking Kripke's Causal theory and Searle's Cluster theory. Such issues 
he finds with said theories are ones easily avoided by adopting a pragmatic view of language. His 
theory “places the emphasis on what reference and names do” whereas the other theories simply 
state “what they are as part only of a conceptual analysis.” Describing the nature of naming as 
only a descriptive action is a major fault that Boersema sees for Kripke and Searle. Both of 
whom only say what naming is about and refuse to put it into a greater schema which includes 
the multiple ways in which language functions and interacts in daily discourse. Boersema goes on 
to say that “we do many things when we name and refer, in many different social contexts and for 
many purposes. Naming and referring function for us in a multitude of ways.”21 Searle and 
Kripke are equally guilty of ignoring the nature of language in the world. The Causual theory 
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divorces the ultitiy of names from their causal chain; the Cluster theory identifies names as a 
hook to rest descriptors on, but that hook has no other given function. 
 “Reference and names,” Boersema writes, “are a matter of coping with and in the world; 
this coping is not just a matter of functioning in the world but also a matter of changing the 
world. Effects of names are part of the very nature and function of names.”22 The disadvantage of 
other views on refering is that they understand naming as a one-way street of sorts. Names go off 
into the world and shape it, but never before has it been considered for such names to turn around 
and return the favor unto names themselves. Though functions of names might have crossed the 
mind of theorists, their effect on us has not. And that, according to Boersema, is what sets his 
pragmatic theory appart. Within the nature of names are the effects which echo back upon it in its 
usage. 
 Upon a closer examination from this brief exposition into Boersema's theory, it appears 
that it, too, is in contrast to the premise regarding defintions and synonyms in the “Two 
Dogmas.” A major component of Boersema's theory was that language is effected by the way in 
which it is used for it is a part of its nature to adjust and change. Thus, language is not something 
to be taken in isolation. Langauge interacts with three “spheres,” as Boersema states: the 
subjective, the intersubjective, and the objective.23 Respectively, these refer to the individual, 
language, and the world. Individuals can only speak of first-person experience. As a result, the 
world is objective in a sense. Langauge acts a buffer between the two insofar as it allows 
subjective agents to communicate about their own first-person experiences and to engage with 
the world. What Quine's premise of a direct corresponding relationship between synonyms and 
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their defintions advocates is an isolation of languag. In the section regarding the relationship 
between the two concepts and throughout the duration of the entire piece he seems to examine 
language in isolation. Never is language engaged with respect to the subjective or objective24. 
Synonyms and defintions are discussed only with their dependency on other. Recalling the 
Harrison/Beatle situation, this argument becomes very obvious. The example intended to 
demonstrate that in swiftly calling all defintions synonymys, Quine ignored the efficancy of some 
defintions over others. Efficancy is not just a matter of intersubjective language; it, too, relates to 
the subjective and objective. The world is, in some sense, the measure of efficancy. For the 
external world gives speakers the ability to see if what is being referred to is done so in a well-
enough manner that he knows who it being called out, or if refinement is need. Alternatively, 
individual agents are involved in the Harrion/Beatle example since they are the agents who are 
determining said efficancy. Ergo, in making such a bold claim, Quine is treating language within 
a vaccum where such spheres, as well as features of langauage as context and social situation, are 
completely brushed off. 
 So what, the question can be posed, might Boersema say about the premise in question? 
The conclusions are certainly difficult to imagine, but the method is not. For he clearly would 
take the pragmatic approach and examine that functions, contexts, and the three spheres plays. 
Through uncovering how such factors mingle in language is to gain a deeper understanding of 
definitions and synonyms as opposed to the superficial commentary by Quine.  
 What has been exposed so far is that the first premise, which states that all definitions are 
synonyms. The investigation into proper names led to the next premise, which exposes the article 
                                                 
24 His comments on extensional languages might be understood as an attempt to fuse his examination with the 
objective. However, that part only attends to the language-world relation insofar as to make the brief supposition 
that terms may agree extensional on accident, so that can be disregarded.  
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as being more compatible with the Cluster theory of naming while at the same time being 
incompatible with the Casual theory and the pragmatic approach. Both premises are not only 
related to one another; the second spawns from the first. The third premise is radically different 
than the other two for it revolves around the notion of the necessary condition of cognitive 
synonymy. 
 Quine's analysis of analytic statements eventually leads him to the concept of 
interchangeability of terms. He wrote that “a natural suggestion, observing closer examination, is 
that the synonymy of two linguistic forms consists simply in their interchangeability in all 
context without change of truth value – interchangeability, in Leibniz's phrase, salva 
veritate.” 25 This does indeed sound like a natural start to the exploration of interchangeability, 
which is needed for cognitive synonymy (which turns typical naturally analytic statements into 
ones which are logically true). By the end of the section Quine concludes that “interchangeability 
salva veritate... is not a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy of the type required for 
explaining analyticity.”26  
  In making such a claim, Quine is establishing the third premise that the reader must 
accept to agree with his thesis. That premise dictates that interchangeability and maintaining the 
truth value of a statement are two subjects intertwined so that they may be considered under the 
same single condition. What exactly this means should becomes more clear in looking deeper 
into the above passages from Quine. He thought that interchangeability salva veritate was not a 
sufficient condition for cognitive synonymy. What must be noted is that this is not a single 
condition, but rather two separate and distinct conditions. Somebody might be able to make that 
claim if there is something inherent within the concepts of interchangeability and salva veritate 
 20 
that demonstrated a strong relation between the two. As it stands, though, there does not appear 
to be such a relationship. The component of interchangibilty only refers to the swapping of one 
word for another. The other component considers the truth-value of a statement. For either, 
situations can be imagined where words are changed with thinking about the truth-value of them, 
or possible where a sentence is not altered at all so that the truth-value is maintained. The point is 
that there is no reason why these two concepts can or are lumped up to form one single, let alone 
sufficent, condition for cogntive synonymy. True as it might be that for the purpose of the study 
that they are related in some sense since synonymy is interchanging words with the hopes of 
keeping the truth of the sentence, that does not means that interchangibilty salva veritate is a 
single condition. 
  With the division between said conditions now made, does it still make sense to call them 
sufficient conditions? We cannot declare both of these to be sufficient conditions for analyticity. 
If one was satisfied and not the other, then analyticity is not determined and therefore it is 
senseless to call both terms a sufficent condition.  Instead, both of these separate categories must 
be necessary conditions for analyticity. The reason why these conditions have moved to the realm 
of necessity is that neither of them are independently sufficient for analyticity; at the same time 
they are both required in order to complete Quine's cognitive synonym. To turn statements into 
logically true ones, it is unquestionably necessary that there is an interchange of words from one 
form to another. With that ability, the shift from naturally analytic to logically analytic statements 
is impossible. Changing words, however, does not inherently take into consideration the truth 
values. That was a main concern in the previous paragraph. That is why it must be its own 
necessary condition. The same is true of salva veritate. The concept is vital for Quine's cognitive 
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synonymy, yet it is not internally connected to interchangeability. 
  What this exploration into this premise has shown is that it is unreasonable to assume that 
interchangeability salva veritate is a single sufficient condition. However, Quine poses that this 
lone sufficient condition is all that is needed to take into account cognitive synonymy. As it has 
been shown, that single condition must be amended into two separate necessary conditions in 
order to make of that form of synonymy. 
 That elucidation concludes this part of the rebuttal, which its purpose was to uncovering 
the hidden premises within Quine's paper and their subsequent flaws. As stated, there are other 
areas of the “Two Dogmas” that contains philosophical problems.  
 
Theoretical Troubles 
 For this criticism of Quine's “Two Dogmas,” what will be examined are the theories of 
meaning that conform to the dual positions that Quine takes within the essay. In particular, how 
such theories of meaning fit with the concepts of the logical and the naturally analytic statements 
will be at the center of attention. To postulate two different kinds of analytic sentences, Quine is 
essentially offering two forms that actually reflect two radically dissimilar ideas of how words 
means insofar as they are not compatible with one another. Yet with his adherence of the ability 
for the naturally analytic statements to be transformed into the logically analytic, he is placing a 
foot in on each opposing side. The result of which is the baffling conclusion that he establishes. 
Had Quine either completely abandoned one theory of meaning for another, his thesis might have 
proven to be much stronger. 
 What are these theories of meaning that are being alluded to? They are those that were 
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taken up by some of the dominating schools of philosophical thought on language that existed 
during the time of the publication of the “Two Dogmas.” How the logical form of analyticity 
means can be answered by looking into the works of the logical positivists. These thinkers, to 
summarize their position briefly, examined the logical structure of language to avoid the 
confusion ordinary language causes. To them, philosophical problems are the result of the flaws 
inherent in natural language. Thus, by using symbolic logic, these advocates of logical positivism 
could understand philosophical truths in a much cleaner and clearer manner. Several notable 
names in logical positivism include A.J. Ayer, Rudolf Carnap. Mortiz Schlick and Otto Neurath.  
 Opposing them and embodying the theory of meaning for the natural form of analytic 
sentences are the ordinary language philosophers. Such thinkers were skeptical of the method of 
the positivists. Their investigations sterilized language and subjected it to an iron framework that 
runs counter to how humans use language in the day-to-day realm. Rather than abstract 
syntactical structures from sentences, adherents to ordinary language philosophy saw examining 
language in its natural state was the best approach. Philosophical truths, to them, cannot be 
uncovered by looking at structures alone but also at such aspects of language like context and 
speech acts. Famous thinkers who fall under the category include John Austin, John Searle, P.F. 
Strawson, and Gilbert Ryle.  
 What will happen next is a brief investigation into each school of thought. With a firm 
grasp of the theories under our belt, the connections between the logical positivist movement to 
the logical form of analyticity, and the ordinary language philosophy school with the natural 
form, will be understood. From there, the information will be applied directly to Quine's thesis. 
Ideally that will generate a clear picture of the fact that in order for Quine partake on his quest, he 
needed to have a stake in both the logical positivist and ordinary language philosophy accounts of 
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meaning simultaneously. 
 For our purpose, the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein will prove most profitable. Not only 
did he himself take both positions throughout the course of his lifetime, but Wittgenstein also 
composed the foundational (or, at least, extremely influential) texts for both movements. The 
pieces are the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (published in 1922) and Philosophical 
Investigations (published posthumously in 1953). The Tractatus contains numerous ideas agreed 
upon by logical positivists, such as the picture theory of meaning. In the Investigations, 
Wittgenstein does not explicitly offer a theory of meaning that counters his older view. What he 
writes, however, are harsh criticisms of the view directed against his previous work. Within the 
Investigations are two major concepts that will later define and influence ordinary language 
philosophers: language-games and the family resemblance of words.  
 In comprehending why the positivists take their approach the way they do, it is helpful to 
understand how language is fallible through what Wittgenstein wrote. He said the following: “In 
the language of everyday life it very often happens that the same word signifies two different 
ways – and therefore belongs to two different symbols – or that two words, which signify in 
different ways, are apparently applied in the same way in the proposition.” Language is littered 
with instances of words sharing the same symbol while differing meanings are assigned to them. 
The example that Wittgenstein gives is the word “is.” That word may refer to either existence or 
identity. Employed in the assertion that “Jack is happy,” what it implies is that Jack exists in a 
certain state of happiness. Used in “Tommy is Jack,” it is drawing parallels between two people. 
Simply looking at the isolated word individually, unfortunately, does not reveal what meaning 
should be employed. Because two meanings are employed by the same sign, that leads to serious 
philosophical issues. Wittgenstein goes on to note in the succeeding proposition that “there easily 
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arises the most fundamental confusions (of which the whole of philosophy is full).”27 
 The solution to such problems is suggested in the following section:  
In order to avoid these errors, we must employ a symbolism which excludes them, by not 
applying the same sign in different symbols and by not applying signs in the same way which 
signify in different ways. A symbolism, that is to say, which obeys the rules of logical grammar – 
of logical syntax.28 
Logical symbolism is the means that Wittgenstein envisions will save philosophy from the errors 
inherent in natural language. For in symbolism, the fundamental errors infecting language are 
readily recognized and dealt with in a manner that counters such situations identical the one with 
the word “is”. Philosophical issues appear in that word because the same sign signifies two ways. 
Logical symbolism will draft two different signs for separate meanings. Likewise, symbols will 
not be used to signify two meanings for the same reasons. Aside from circumventing 
philosophical errors, symbolism not only must obey logical grammar, symbolism exposes it 
clearly. If propositions are boiled down to their bare logical components, then how those 
sentences operate logically is open for examination. Thus for the logical positivists, what matters 
to them is searching for the underlying logical syntax of sentences to avoid the problematic 
features of natural language. 
 An additional point that will be taken from the Tractatus is the picture theory. 
Wittgenstein starts his exposition into his theory in proposition 2.1, where he states, “we make to 
ourselves pictures of facts. The picture presents the facts in logical space, the existence or 
nonexistence of atomic facts. The picture is a model of reality.” What are these “facts” that he 
mentions? He is referring to atomic facts that are the basic descriptors of reality. That is what he 
means by such statements like “the totality of existent atomic facts is the world” and “the 
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existence and nonexistence of atomic facts is the reality.”29 Like atoms composing the objects of 
the world, atomic facts describe reality at the most fundamental level. Why examine atomic 
facts? It is because they are “individuated and described, and it is therefore possible to make 
wholly true or wholly false statements about them.”30 Atomic facts are disentangled from more 
complex facts regarding the world and, because of that, their truth-value can certainly be 
determined without being detrimental to others. Getting back to the matter at hand, Wittgenstein 
mentioned that we make pictures of these facts to ourselves. And due to the nature of these facts, 
generating a picture of them will subsequently mirror reality. Pictures also exhibit the existence 
and nonexistence of atomic facts.  
 How it is that these pictures picture? Wittgenstein mentions, “in order to be a picture a 
fact must have something in common with what it pictures.” So what is the common feature 
between the picture and reality? That question is answered later when he states that “what every 
picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it at 
all – rightly or falsely – is the logical form, that is, the form of reality.” Wittgenstein goes on: “If 
the form of representation is the logical form, then the picture is called a logical picture. Every 
picture is also a logical picture…The picture has the logical form of representation in common 
with what it pictures.”31 It is here that the role of the logical form of statements becomes critical. 
As mentioned, what the logical positivists saw as important in language is the underlying logical 
structure of sentences. Hence, logical symbolism was utilizing to express forms whilst avoiding 
the complications plaguing natural language. Yet it is the logical form that Wittgenstein claims is 
the connection between the picture and reality for it is identical between reality and the picture. 
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Due to this, any picture is a logical one as well. All pictures by their nature must display the 
logical form so that they may relate to the world, thereby being logical pictures at the same time. 
Therefore, the logical form is critical to the picture theory insofar as it being the substance that 
links the picture with the pictured. 
 Now, we have a general view of the picture theory. There are statements of natural 
language. Natural language, being deficient and troublesome, has everything excluding the 
logical structure subtracted. Statements like “Wittgenstein is philosophical” or “If it rains, then 
the sidewalk is wet” are broken down into logical components to create such statements like 
“Pw” and “R→W” respectively.  With the logical form exposed, the forms between reality and 
the proposition can be compared for measuring the truth-value. To illustrate this theory further, 
consider how biographers believe that Wittgenstein was struck with the epiphany of the picture 
theory. According to Avrum Stroll, Wittgenstein read an article about an automobile accident that 
was brought before court. A model of the incident was created to inform the judge of what 
happened: 
Wittgenstein was struck by the fact that the model was able to represent the accident because of 
the correspondence between its components and the persons, automobiles, and places actually 
involved in the accident. He thus suddenly realized that a proposition could serve a similar 
function. It could provide a picture of the world through a correlation of its linguistic elements 
with the actual persons and things it speaks about. Using this analogy, he decided that a 
proposition could be thought of as a picture of reality. Hence, the picture theory was born.32  
Wittgenstein saw the model presented in court as a snapshot of reality insofar as the elements of 
the model directly corresponded to the elements of the incident itself. Language, likewise, 
performs a parallel function, so says the picture theory. The components of language, by analogy, 
match up to the picture of reality that it attempts to display. Thus, the atomic facts the picture 
displays relates to language in a like fashion that a model does. 
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 Tautologies and self-contradictions make their appearance in Wittgenstein's book as well. 
Remember that the usage of them within the context of the logical form of analyticity is their 
reliance on their unshakable foundations. On that topic, Wittgenstein writes on that whilst 
developing his idea of truth tables this:  
Among the possible groups of truth-conditions there are two extreme conditions. In the one case 
the proposition is true for all the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions. We say that 
the truth-conditions are tautological. In the second case the proposition is false for all the truth-
possibilities. The truth-conditions are self-contradictory.33  
Wittgenstein is really saying nothing all that new about the tautologies or self-contradictions. 
However, he adds onto the fact that these two forms of true or falsity at polar ends. They are the 
extremes of truth. 
 Wittgenstein later clarifies this point:  
Tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of the reality. They present no possible states of 
affairs. For the one allows every possible state of affairs, the other none. In the tautology the 
conditions of agreement with the world – the presenting relations – cancels one another, so that is 
stands in no presenting relation to reality. The truth-conditions determine the range, which is left 
to the facts of the proposition...Tautology leaves to reality the whole infinite logical space; 
contradiction fills the whole logical space and leaves no point to reality. Neither of them, 
therefore, can in any way determine reality.34 
Tautologies and self-contradictions cannot function as pictures of reality alone. They lie on the 
extremes of meaning. Neither can either of them represent states of reality for one represents all 
possible states and the other none. In reality, tautologies are constantly present; someone who is a 
bachelor is always a bachelor. Also, within reality there is a consistency in regards to self-
contradicts, for there are none in nature. The relationship between tautology and self-
contradiction generates the spectrum of meaning to which the whole of meaning falls into. On 
the other hand, either determines no meaning whatsoever. 
 Fallibility of language, emphasis on the usefulness of symbolic logic, the relation between 
tautologies and self-contradictions, and the picture theory are four primary components of logical 
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positivism, each of which influences Quine's notion of the logical form of analytic propositions. 
Here is how. Remember that it was supposed that the logical form is, essentially, Aristotle's law 
of non-contradiction or a tautology. In rooting that form in generally accepted axioms, Quine 
gives analyticity (if the natural form connected to the logical) a solid and unshakable foundation. 
How it is unshakable? It is so in the exact same way that Wittgenstein brought up contradictions 
and tautologies where the whole range of meaning is composed, at its base, of tautologies or self-
contradictions. Whereas statements like “No unmarried man is married” flesh out states of 
affairs, the foundation of its meaning is thanks to the core observance towards the law of non-
contradiction. Thereby, this is the connection between thoughts on tautologies and contradictions 
among logical positivists and Quine’s notion of logical analyticity. Logical analyticity observes 
the boundaries of meaning generated by those two concepts and respects them insofar as to 
require all logically analytic statements to conform in one way or another.  
 Another point of convergence among logical positivism and Quine emerges when 
considering the notion of the fallibility of language. A way to reduce the philosophical harm from 
natural language is to abstract it into symbolic logic. Semantics no longer pose problems when 
the signs have been reduced to variables. Though “is” has potential semantic problems, no 
reasonable person could be confused if, say, either option is assigned two separate variables. 
Likewise with Quine's example, we can further simplify his logical form into “No -Px is Px” and 
further to - x (Px & -Px) immediately tells anyone what statements will follow the law of non-
contradiction. Only examining the natural form cannot tell us right off the bat if it is to be 
deemed analytic or not.  
Take, for example, the phrase “Green is an extended object.” Used by Quine as an attack 
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against analyticity, Grice and Strawson claimed it is unfair to exemplify the statement for 
displaying the confusion of analytic statements. Why so is because there are serious philosophical 
considerations involved in that statement. Does green count as an extended body? What does 
“extended” or “body” mean? Does that phrase refer to green objects, or greenness itself? Before 
any thought can be given to the analyticity of that sentence, these questions are hurdles that derail 
analytical determination. What this embodies are two like ideas from the logical positivists and 
the logical form of analyticity. First is the fallibility of natural language. Remember that 
Wittgenstein stated that philosophy was full of problems that were caused by the misuse of 
language. The same goes for the above example. Early Wittgenstein would claim that the issues 
stemming from questioning what it means to be extended is merely a puzzle of language. Natural 
language generates these puzzles that Wittgenstein believed must be done away with. This leads 
to the second point of convergence: the use of logical symbolism. Because language is flawed, 
used symbols with assigned meanings and the like can bypass such problems as above. 
Wittgenstein clearly made this statement in the Tractatus. Quine also is showed to believe the 
same when considering that the main reason why he uses examples like “No bachelor is 
unmarried” is so that meanings no longer cause issues. For the logical components make that 
statement unconditionally true. Also, we are able to simplify that statement down to a purely 
logical formula like - x (Px & -Px). Therefore, here are two other instances of one category of 
analyticity conforming to the theory of the logical positivists.  
 Finally, how Quine's logical form is similar to the logical positivists view is that it proves 
to be an example of the picture theory. Call to mind what Wittgenstein said about the picture 
theory was that all pictures present a logical form, and that is what the picture has in common if 
what is being represented. Applying that to the logical form of analyticity, it might be argued that 
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the symbolic representation of the logical form acts like the logical form of a picture, which 
thereby directly represents reality. For any statement with the logical form of “No -Px is Px” will 
reflect reality since in the world there exists no such things that both possess and do not possess a 
particular trait. So the logical form of a statement like “No unmarried man is married” has a 
logical form that identical to that with reality. 
 With the association between the logical positivists view of meaning and the logical form 
of analyticity revealed, an exposition into how the natural form of language connects to the 
ordinary language philosophy's understanding of meaning can begin primarily through examining 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Unlike the Tractatus, Wittgenstein never offers a 
theory of meaning in his later work. Instead, he criticizes his previous theory while examining 
features of language that are vital for a linguistic investigation which are left untouched by the 
positivist viewpoint. 
 Wittgenstein's self-critique appears while he is elucidating his idea of language-games. 
Upon asking the rhetorical question of how many kinds of sentences are there, he replies:  
There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call 'symbols', 'words', 
'sentences'. And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of 
language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete 
and get forgotten...Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that 
the speaking of language is part of an activity, or form of life.35  
According to Wittgenstein, language is a much more flexible concept than conceived by the 
logical positivists, who saw language (especially the grammatical structure) as quite rigid. The 
emergence of new kinds of components of language, like words, sentences and symbols, and the 
death of old kinds is a concept that Wittgenstein is willing to entertain. Why is this so? Because 
he views language speaking as an activity. And the stance of it as an activity greatly influences 
the creation and destruction of new and old kinds of sentences.  
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 What, exactly, does Wittgenstein mean by saying that speaking language is an activity? 
True as it may be that the utterance of words is activity insofar as the body is expelling air 
through the vocal cords in order to generate the correct pitch and speed to be interpreted as 
words. However, Wittgenstein puts the notion of language as activity in a social context. This is 
the advantage of the term “language-games”: it summarizes the complexity of language insofar 
as the role that context plays in language. Playing a game requires the players to follow a certain 
set of rules. Different games enact different rules. Monopoly adheres to special move and action 
rules as oppose to checkers, which both are radically different than ice hockey. Just like with 
games, social activities have specific contexts to which the speakers follow the rules. Language-
games are the contextual rules accompanying a social-linguistic situation. Some of the examples 
of language-games are situations like giving orders, taking orders, reporting an event, talking 
about an event, singing, playing, making up a story, asking, questioning, thanking, swearing, 
along with countless others. Tagging on at the end of that list is the passage by Wittgenstein 
saying that “it is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways 
they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about 
the structure of language. (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus).”36  
 Take an example of an activity where language exists in along with its language-game and 
one can see how critical context is. Imagine that you are performing in a play (thus the language-
game is “acting in a play”) and you recite the line “Lo, I have been slain!” Remove the line and 
place it verbatim in another language-game and it is clear how valuable examining language-
games are to truly understanding language. Let us take the line and stick it into the language-
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game of, to borrow one from Wittgenstein's list, describing the appearance of an object. Though 
the line “Lo, I have been slain!” makes perfect sense in a play, when applied towards describing 
an object it no longer makes any sense whatsoever. What about in the language-game of reporting 
on an event? The line can certainly fit the context far better, especially if the speaker has been 
shot or stabbed.  
 Sense is not the only factor that matters when discussing language-games. 
Comprehending what language-game an utterance is in can give deep insight to what is really 
being said. For example, if the line “Lo, I have been slain!” has be yelled in a play, nobody in the 
audience is going to run for the lobby to phone an ambulance. Because the listeners and the 
speaker know the language-game is “acting in a play,” the viewers know that what is happening 
onstage is not real; it is an expression for the character that the actor is embodying if that 
situation occurred. To use some jargon by John Austin, language-games can help separate the 
locationary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary aspects of language. The locution of the line is 
simply the exclamation that one has been slain. The illocution says that the person uttering the 
line wishes to have the audience understand his character is hurt. And the perlocution is the 
consequence of the audience, perhaps feelings of sadness or pity. Hence, here is an example of 
how vital language-games can be to philosophy of language. 
 Avrum Stroll provides the following exposition on language-games:  
A language game is a slice of everyday human activity; each slice is different; some may include 
the activities of builders, others of lawyers, and some may focus on such practices as affirming, 
doubting, believing, and following rules. Language games not only refer to individual human 
activities but to those that are common to the whole community...By appealing to language 
games, Wittgenstein is urging the traditional philosopher not to think but to look and see what 
person actually do and say in the course of their daily live. The description of such activities and 
utterances rather than a synoptic philosophical theory about them will provide an accurate 
picture of reality.37 
Stroll recognizes the importance of the interplay between language-games and human activities; 
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the two do not operate in isolation. Instead, language-games are as shaped by human activities as 
human activities are shaped by language-games. This occurs not only at the level of interaction 
within a workplace or a situation in life, but to a whole community. That is exactly what 
Wittgenstein was getting at when he wrote that “to imagine a language means to imagine a form 
of life.”38  
 The philosophical implications that result from examining language-games is, so says 
Stroll, a shift away from what might be deemed a traditional view of philosophy where thinker 
take an aspect of the world and abstracted foundations and forms of them. Wittgenstein urges, on 
the other hand, that philosophers look at how language functions in the arena of the world. 
Foundations and forms may be useful in some philosophical sense, but to sterilize philosophy and 
language from reality. The ultimate objective of such a paradigm shift is to look at utterances and 
descriptions is to adopt an attitude more accurate at describing reality.  
 This Wittgensteinian exposition will conclude with a study into an influential concept 
derived from the Philosophical Investigations, which reflect a shift from adapting a sterile figure 
of language to a more pragmatic model. And that is the concept of family resemblance; an idea 
where Wittgenstein demands philosophers “don't think; but look!” Consider this ancient example 
taken from the Platonic dialogue Meno. During the course of the dialogue, Meno confronts 
Socrates to ask him what is virtue. Claiming ignorance, Socrates turns the tables on Meno and 
questions him as to what he thinks virtue is. Meno propose such traits like carrying on the affairs 
of a city, doing harm to enemies and doing friends well, and differing traits for women, children 
and the elderly. Socrates is disappointed in the answer and gives Meno another try, and he ends 
up mainly repeating himself. Never was Socrates told the defining characteristic of all virtues, 
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but instances of virtue. He says: “Although seeking one, we have found many virtues, but in 
another way than we did just now. But the one which exists throughout all of these we are not 
able to find out.”39 Socrates does not want particular virtues, only what allows for character traits 
like justice and prudence to be labeled virtuous. 
 Whereas Plato will use the dialogue to propose his theory of Forms, Wittgenstein may 
claim that Socrates put Meno up to an impossible task. For virtue to be identified, there must be 
some common thread running through all examples of virtues. Wittgenstein does not fall back 
upon the Platonic Forms; he suggests the idea of family resemblance among words. In the case of 
virtue, there is no single, common thread running throughout all and every example of a virtue. 
By looking (and not thinking) of the many virtues that Meno lists, Wittgenstein would respond 
with this passage: “We see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: 
sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.” A classification of virtues does 
not entail the discovery of the essence of virtue, for that is not the case. Many virtues have 
common features with some, but not with all. Such terms like virtues should, instead, be viewed 
as a network of these sometimes overlapping similarities, where “the strength of the thread does 
not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of 
many fibres.”40 Here is a perfect example of what Wittgenstein means by “don't think, but look!” 
By looking at how language function can concepts like family resemblance arise. 
 Wittgenstein, of course, was not the only proponent of the ordinary language view. 
Another thinker popular amongst the movement is Friedrich Waismann. His article titled 
“Verifiability” challenges the thought that there is one correct description of the world through 
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exposing the philosophical concerns that surface in proclaiming the existence of exact 
definitions. Waismann notes what is problematic about expecting exact definitions is it requires 
speakers to assume nothing will ever change about said definition. This is equally true of 
scientific definition. Gold might be thought of amongst the general populace as a substance that 
has specific, unique characteristics. But what if a new material was mined sharing nearly all of 
the same features of gold, excluding that it has a radiation level is much higher? In light of this, 
Waismann concludes it would alter our definition of gold to include the component of gold 
having a particular radiation level and not another.41 
 From this, Waismann abstracts his idea of words being “open texture.” To expound the 
concept, he writes:  
Try as we may, no concept is limited in such a way that there is no room for any doubt. We 
introduce a concept and limit it in some directions; for instance, we define gold in contrast to 
some other metals such as alloys. This suffices for our present needs, and we do not probe any 
farther. We tend to overlook the fact that there are always other directions in which the concept 
has not been defined. And if we did, we could easily imagine conditions which would necessitate 
new limitations. In short, it is not possible to define a concept like gold with absolute precision, 
i.e. in such a way that every nook and cranny is blocked against entry or doubt. That is what is 
meant by the open texture of a concept.42 
According to Waismann, there is no definition that is so airtight that it removes any and all room 
for doubt or re-examination. For exactness of definitions to be present requires such a concept to 
be revealed in all possible manners. There are features of gold that remain unknown to us. This 
does not mean that gold is a remarkably vague idea. But when metallurgistic discoveries 
challenge the common understanding of gold, it is the catalyst, which drives further 
investigations. Alternatively, the same is true of a person. No matter how close, two friends will 
never know everything about the other. So when it is found that one friend enjoys watching 
Mexican soap operas in their basement while listening to Georgian chants as they shave the 
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Greek alphabet onto their goat Herby, that challenges the other friend’s present understanding of 
that person. Hence, concepts are open texture because they are open to doubt. Our knowledge of 
definitions is textured and, thereby, is open to skepticism and reform.  
 As with the exploration into the doctrine of logical positivism, this examination will 
conclude with the connection between this theory of meaning and one of the kinds of analyticity 
Quine outlined. Treatment as such has already been paid to the logical form; similar dues must be 
paid to the natural form. Now, unlike the logical form, Quine does not give the reader much to 
work with about this form. There are much less philosophical tidbits to chew on with it. 
Unfortunately, that means much of what can be gathered from the natural form must be inferred 
since as soon as Quine brings up that form of analyticity he immediately starts the investigation. 
This is particularly odd since he mentions that “the difficultly lies not in the first class of analytic 
statements, the logical truths, but rather in the second class.”43 If the difficultly lay with the 
second category, then why did he not explain what that kind was in depth? 
 That is a problem that should not stop the investigation and comparison between late 
Wittgenstein and the natural form of analyticity. Instead, we can only assume Quine was implying 
with the natural form whatever we can derive from natural language as a whole. What should our 
first step be? Clearly, it we should do as Wittgenstein said and look at our situation, and not 
think. Take Quine's example of a naturally analytic statement “No bachelor is married” and 
“zoom out” to understand the language-game that it is in. What is it? The manner that we have 
been looking at examples like this has been through a philosophical lens; far removed from many 
kinds of public discourse. In particular, our language-game has analyticity and its criteria at the 
core. We may describe the language-game of this entire essay as one of “performing a 
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philosophical investigation into analyticity.” The benefit it gives to the situation is it reminds us 
that the phrase above has a much different context than it contains in a situation where, say, two 
people are discussing marriage customs. Here, our talk of bachelors is not concerned with 
genders and marital partners. Our discussion is concerned with how the meanings of those words 
apply to our understanding of analyticity. 
 It might be brought up that, in our investigation into the naturally analytic, how 
Waismann's notion of open texture plays into the investigation. It could be argued that, because 
open texture states that words cannot have precise and exact definitions, that analyticity of that 
variety is a lost cause. Since our understanding of words can change with new empirical 
discoveries, then how can analyticity truly be a sound concept? What must be noted is, though 
open texture does indeed give some leeway to meaning, meaning is a not free-for-all. Words 
clearly mean. Open texture only states that we must be aware of the relationship between the 
meaning and the meaned, what is pointing and what is being pointed to, is not a clear-cut direct 
relationship. It does not discount how analyticity is possible for natural language. Tautologies and 
self-contradictions can still occur even with the “wiggle room” of meaning. 
 What results is that there is a shift away from any sort of attempt to generate a kind of 
logical structure that fits any and all kinds of analytic statements. Why? Because our 
apprehension of the current language-game suggests that we are not “zooming in” to the 
substructure of phrases but “zooming out” to gain a better understanding of analyticity in the 
general schema of language. Whereas logical positivists enjoy taking one instance of an analytic 
statement and discovering a universal structure, ordinary language philosophers would much 
rather look at the totality of what philosophers consider analytic statements. In other words, 
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analyticity is better grasped through seeing the grander picture that encompasses all analytic 
statements. 
 Think about what other sort of sentences have been universally classified as analytic 
throughout the history of Western philosophy. Consider those that have crafted philosophers' 
understanding of analyticity to what it is today. Obviously, there is the “all bachelors are 
unmarried” example that Quine enjoys. There is also “Gold is a yellow metal,” “all triangles have 
three sides,” and “all bodies are extended.” These are phrases pulled mainly from Kant: a thinker 
who most philosophers associate analytic statements with. Perhaps you have been taught to see 
what common features exist in all to define analyticity for yourself. Ordinary language 
philosophers would disagree to that method. Alternatively, these philosophers would claim that 
there is no single analytic fiber running throughout the classical examples. What the classical 
examples generate is a network throughout which analyticity is understood.  
 Examine what has just been done. Our acknowledgment of what language-game the 
exploration into analyticity has caused us to transcend nitpicking “no bachelor is unmarried” to 
redirect our attention to analyticity as a whole. This transcendence is the exact opposite move a 
logical positivist would make. Positivists would be much more comfortable continuing that 
nitpicking to an even more microscopic degree. Transcendence has thus made us look at what 
draws together our traditional examples of analyticity and question why they are lumped under 
the category. But that does not mean what single feature makes them all analytic. Rather, we 
looked at what network forms between them. Never was our intention to define analyticity 
through the lens of ordinary language philosophy. The intention was to show how the naturally 
analytic statements conform to a much different theory of meaning than the logical. 
 The reader will surely notice that through the previous section of the essay a stark divide 
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between the background theories of meaning accompanying the two categories of analyticity. The 
logical is associated with the positivists. These philosophers dig down to the formal 
underpinnings of statements, where abstracted logical forms reflect reality and obtain their 
meaning through how accurately the form of the sentence reflects the form of reality via the 
picture theory. The natural form is associated with ordinary language philosophy, which examines 
the language-games and family resemblance of meaning. Rather than deeply examining the 
microscopic features of language and cutting away whatever does not fit their neat format, 
ordinary language philosophers welcomes the nitty-gritty. Proponents examine language in its 
social context and take in how human activities affect meaning, all the while building definitions 
through looking at not what is common among all but how the network of meaning is created. 
 Comparing and contrasting the above features of the two theories of meaning does not 
expose the far deeper philosophical implications of such ideas. Logical positivism and the 
ordinary language view differ on many deeper levels too. Where truth is drawn from is one such 
example of conflicts between them. For the logical positivists, truth of statements is determined 
by it correspondence with reality. What this means is that a statement like “Gold is a yellow 
metal” is truthful if that is how things really are. Wittgenstein's picture theory embodies this. The 
gist of that theory declares that all propositions are pictures which, via logical forms, reflect 
reality. It is a requirement for sentences to having meaning that they accurately reflect the world. 
Thus, the truth-conditions for logical positivists are determined by comparing the proposition 
with reality.  
 Contra the correspondence view is coherentism: a theory that dictates that propositions 
get their truth in the context of other propositions. How coherentism relates to the ordinary 
language view is clear when bringing up an example by Nelson Goodman. In countering David 
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Hume's notion of regularities of experience, Goodman proposes this situation. Just as we can 
classify an emerald as “green,” we can also classify it as “grue.” To say that something is grue is 
to state that it will be green up until time t is reached, and then afterwards it is blue. This means 
that for emeralds, we can draw two different inductions from them: one stating that they are green 
and the other saying they will be blue after time t. Our world can easily be categorized into 
classes such as green and blue, or equally grue and green.  What Goodman sought to achieve was 
to show that regularities, though they appear in nature, appear in a multitude. A particular 
regularity might state that objects are defined as green or blue; another could say that said objects 
are grue or green. Which regularity is used happens to be a matter of pragmatics and habit.44 
 With the grue/green thought-experiment, what is apparent is the coherentism of ordinary 
language philosophy. The point of Goodman's example was to show the way in which the world 
is classified is not done so through some natural regularity. There is nothing inherent within, say, 
emeralds demanding speakers to call it green over grue. Yet, if two speakers each called emeralds 
grue and green, both are correct. Grue functions fine as a means of demarcating the color of 
emeralds. In a way, between the green and the grue users, there are two functioning 
correspondence theories going on. There are multiple correspondences, in a sense, because both 
grue and green function. Because of this, we come to a conclusion that this is more of a 
coherence view of truth. Since there are multiple ways of describing the world, this means that 
correspondence in the sense that logical positivists use it cannot function as well. 
 This leads to an even deeper divide between ordinary language proponents and the logical 
positivists. It has been shown that the positivists agree with a correspondence theory of truth. As 
a result, the positivists also adhere to the notion that there is only one correct description of the 
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world. The nature of logical forms and the picture theory states propositions cannot be 
interpreted in multiple ways.  x (Px & Px) can only be viewed as  x (Px & Px). There is no 
possible way to incorporate different meanings unto that statement.  
 Additionally, positivists strove for a single, correct, scientific explanation of the world. 
The inherent scientism of logical positivism is obvious in the thoughts of multiple proponents. 
Scientism states that the only meaningful things to be said are those of scientific propositions. 
Near the end of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein makes the point by saying that the true objective of 
philosophy is “to say nothing expect what can be said” which are “the propositions of natural 
science.” When encountering fields like metaphysics, Wittgenstein claims one must “demonstrate 
to him [the metaphysician] that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions.”45 
A.J. Ayer, in his book Language, Truth and Logic, both agrees with Wittgenstein about the 
relationship between science and philosophy as well as attacks those who do not conform. He 
writes that it is not philosophy's task to generate speculative truths which pass over science. 
Rather, a philosopher's job is “to clarify the propositions of science by exhibiting their logical 
relationships, and by defining the symbols which occur in them.” Again, there is deep within the 
logical positivists tradition the feeling that science is superior on the grounds that it is the only 
form of knowledge where really meaningful things can be uttered. Ayer attacks metaphysics for 
the same reasons as Wittgenstein; he claims the metaphysician “produces sentences which fail to 
conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant.”46 Since 
metaphysics is accused of sailing phony truths over the head of science, Ayer criticizes it by 
claiming that it cannot produce meaningful statements in the same way that science does. 
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 Ordinary language philosophy has a much different view on the world. Instead of 
believing that there is one correct description of the world, they believe that the world can be 
explained in multiple ways. Recall the grue/green example. In that case, it was determined that to 
call an emerald either green or grue was correct in either case; to maintain that green is the only 
true way to describe an emerald is to ignore the fact that regularities are pragmatic notions. Ergo, 
to the ordinary language advocate, there are many different ways to say the states of affairs in the 
world.  
 Unlike positivism, ordinary language does not have scientism inherent in it. That is not to 
say, however, that scientific propositions are excluded from said theory. What this mean is 
ordinary language still holds the potential of expressing scientific propositions. But it also 
includes the social constructs inherent within language. That is a point already made through 
Wittgenstein and his language-games. It also appears in the works of John Austin in his book 
How to do Things with Words. In it, he claims the following while discussing performance and 
language: 
The utterance of the words is, indeed, usually a, or even the, leading incident in the performance 
of the act...the performance of which is also the object of the utterance, but it is far from being 
usually, even if it is ever, the sole thing necessary if the act is to be deemed to have been 
performed. Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the circumstances in which the words 
are uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very commonly necessary that 
either the speaker himself or other persons should also perform certain other actions, whether 
“physical” or “mental” actions or even acts of uttering further words.47 
What Austin is getting at here is performance as an integral part of speaking a language. 
According to Austin, words themselves that lead the speaker into engaging in a linguistic act, to 
                                                 
47 Austin, 292. 
 43 
which the words also reflect said act. However, the exchange between word and act is not the 
only components. The context of the conversation is another important aspect to consider. 
Circumstances have to be appropriate to the matters at hand. And just as the speaker has actions 
that he must perform, so does the listener too. Hence sociality is obviously present in the ordinary 
language view. From what have been written by John Austin, the view takes into consideration 
the sociality of language, while at the same time being able to express any other sort of 
propositions, including scientific ones. 
 In all, there are numerous ways in which the two views vary. They differ so much that 
they cannot ever be reconcilable. There is no possible was that these two schools of thought can 
be either compatible or relatable. The ultimate result is that it demonstrates the fact that for Quine 
to turn the naturally analytic to the logically analytic would have required him to perform the 
impossible. Quine needed to reconcile these radically two different theories of meaning by either 
breaking one down into the other or for him to makes these two forms function with one another. 
Therefore, the endeavor central at his thesis is downright impossible.   
 To put the last nail in the coffin and demonstrates the serious philosophical consequences 
resulting from Quine trying to leap from one form to the other, consider this. In 1993, a film was 
produced about a biographical/philosophical play written on the life of Wittgenstein. On his 
deathbed, Wittgenstein is comforted by a colleague, who tells the following story outlining not 
only Wittgenstein's philosophical history, but also where he went astray. He tells this fable: 
There was once was a young man who dreamed of reducing the world to pure logic. Because he 
was a very clever young man, he actually managed to do it. And when he finished his work, he 
stood back and admired it. It was beautiful; a world purged of imperfection and indeterminacy. 
Countless acres of gleaming ice stretching to the horizon. So the clever young man looked out 
around the world he created and decided to explore it. He took one step forward and fell flat on 
his back. You see, he had forgotten about friction. The ice was smooth and level and stainless. 
You couldn't walk there. So the clever young man sat down and wept bitter tears.  
 
But as he grew to a wise old man, he came to understand that roughness and ambiguity aren't 
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imperfections; they're what make the world turn. He wanted to run and dance. And the words and 
things scattered upon the ground, were all battered and tarnished and ambiguous. And the wise 
old man saw that's how the way things were. But something in him was still homesick for the ice, 
where everything was radiant and absolute and relentless. Though he had come to like the idea 
of the rough ground, he couldn't bring himself to live there. So now he was marooned between 
earth and ice, at home in neither. And this was the cause of all his grief. 48 
Logical analyticity forms the world of ice. It is smooth, prefect, and free of confusion or 
ambiguity. These features are embodied in the formulations like - x (Px & -Px). This is perfect 
insofar as it is general, determinate and have a definite nature. Nowhere can the flaws of 
language persist. What is said reflects reality like a photograph. Yet it is not without its costs. 
Nobody can live on a world of ice. Equally, nobody can live operating entirely in the world of 
logic. Whereas the world of ice lacks friction, logic lacks the friction necessary to make daily 
linguistic encounters possible. Language is much more ambiguous than imagined in the logical 
sense. It is rough, sometimes confusing, and is a concept that we frequently wrestle to truly 
understand. What it does have, however, is the much-desired friction of life. Natural analyticity 
exists this realm. Language-games and family resemblances create the jagged ground need to 
explore the surface. It may not necessarily eliminate our urges for the stable foundations provide 
by logic.  
 Earth and ice form the conflict that this section was attempting to expose. For in trying to 
make naturally analytic statements conform to logical ones, Quine was essentially trying to mesh 
the background theory underlying the former into the latter. He was attempting to find that 
middle ground between earth and ice. The entire investigation in the “Two Dogmas” was Quine's 
method of breaking mountains while building glaciers, of finding how the logical form can 
reinforce natural analyticity. But the theories that support each category conflict and lead to 
difference philosophical schools, doctrines, and ideas. Quine's essay was doomed from the start. 
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Just as longing for the world of ice on the earth lead Wittgenstein to despair, trying to root of 
form of analyticity in a radically different kind led to grief for Quine. There is one final point that 
will conclude this section. Quine might have saved analyticity from his attack and maintain the 
critique of logical positivism (if who Putnam suggested the article was directed towards is true) 
by simply fully embracing natural analyticity only. In tossing logical analyticity to the wind, 
Quine would no longer need to find a means to mesh the two. True, the natural category is not as 
clean when it comes to defining analyticity as the logical, thus requiring a lengthy investigation. 
However, that does not mean that determining natural analyticity by its own merit is impossible. 
Solely embracing that form of analyticity does not prove to be contradictory for the rest of 
Quine's work either. Consider Quine's idea of the indeterminacy of translations, which is a notion 
deeply embedded in the methods and style of ordinary language philosophy. Ultimately, Quine 
can endorse just one kind of analyticity as a means of avoiding trying to straddle between to 
conflicting and radically differing forms. 
 
Studies in Syntheticity 
 During the course of my researching the subject, one peculiar fact became apparent. 
Being that the “Two Dogmas” caused quite a stir in the philosophical community, many articles 
were produced which run to the aide of the distinction through the defense of analyticity or to the 
aide of Quine by further breaking down the division. Synthetic statements, on the other hand, are 
left as untouched as before the “Two Dogmas” was published. Research did not come up with a 
single article either in favor or opposed to the idea of syntheticity. Even Quine himself ignores 
synthetic sentences. 
 The question is: why does it appear that philosophers are avoiding syntheticity? I say 
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“avoiding” because there is no comprehensible way in the time between this article and Quine's 
that no philosopher ever had the syntheticity on the brain. It is fallacious to declare that synthetic 
statements are equally unfounded merely since analyticity took a harsh blow. But, alas, the 
question remains. My response is to say that what makes syntheticity an avoided subject by 
Quine, his followers, and his opponents, is because it is, essentially, a founded and sound 
concept. 
 Luckily, the article will not require an investigation to the core of syntheticity, though it is 
helpful to begin by looking at where analyticity and syntheticity make an initial prominent 
appearance. Immanuel Kant is the first to explain the distinction. The legendary tome of the 
Critique of Pure Reason strikes a difference within the opening pages. Kant describes there being 
two different categories of judgments. He writes:  
Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something which (covertly) contained in the 
concept A; or B lies outside the concept A, though connected with it. In the former case I call the 
judgement analytic, in the latter synthetic. Analytic judgements (affirmative ones) are therefore 
those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity, while 
those in which this connection is thought without identity should be called synthetic.49 
Other names that he gives analytic and synthetic statements are elucidatory and expansive, 
respectively. What Kant wrote about analytic statements fits our notion of it we have been 
working with through the entire essay. Analytic judgments are those where a predicate is 
contained with a subject and which are understood through identity. Our classic example of “all 
bachelors are unmarried” fits the mold. And, as mentioned earlier in the essay, these judgments 
require the principle of non-contradiction. Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, have 
predicates lie outside of the subject. This requires some sort of investigation in order to confirm 
or deny if said predicates link up with a subjects. An example of this is the phrase “All bachelors 
are unhappy.” Since there is nothing inherent within bachelors that dictate that all of them will be 
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unhappy. Hence, these kinds of judgments are expansive: if true, they increase our knowledge of 
some object. 
 Kant elaborates on this idea in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. In that work, 
he notes that synthetic judgments are of “a posteriori judgements of empirical origin” and that 
“they cannot possibly spring from the principle of analysis, namely, the principle of 
contradiction, alone.” He mentions, however, that synthetic judgments will still need to follow 
the same principle anyway in order for them to make sense.50 Unlike their analytic counterpart, 
synthetic statements cannot be determined true through analysis of subjects. Thereby, such 
judgments arise from empirical investigations into the world and through collecting sensory data.  
 We can gather much from just what he mentioned so far so that we can further 
understanding why philosophers of language had no need to shy away from questioning 
syntheticity. Even without principles firmly defined, philosophical conclusions can still be drawn. 
 Most, if not all philosophers agree with Kant's definition of syntheticity: it is the 
unification of a predicate with a subject where there is no prior connection can be deduced 
through analysis alone. Determining what subject/predicate unifications are true necessitates 
sense-driven empirical investigations. Compare this directly with an outline of Quine's 
philosophical inquiries into analyticity. The grounding of analyticity requires cognitive synonym 
that leans on definitions, which are synonyms that in turn are determined true or false through 
interchangeability without altering the truth-value, so long as agreement is not solely extensional 
and accidental. Recalling the counter-argument written by the pair of Grice and Strawson, a gripe 
they have revolved around the notion that something so fundamental within language was being 
challenged (synonymy). Quine was not writing about synonym to understand how it works; he 
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was figuring out if it works. The same goes for many other concepts he analyzes. For 
interchangeability salve veritate, Quine did not operate under the assumption that terms are 
replaceable without harming the truth of the content. Rather, his article was to deem such an idea 
possible or not. The same goes for cognitive synonymy. Grice and Strawson, in their defense of 
synonymy, are attacking Quine for his lack of faith in such a fundamental aspect of language, 
which leads to more disastrous consequences. 
 With empirical confirmation, as opposed to something like cognitive synonym, there is 
little doubt in philosophical literature to question if such is possible; that is, no one seriously 
doubts that empirical confirmation is a reality. True at the levels of everyday interaction with the 
world up to the upper echelons of scientific research, human beings generally accept that we can 
postulate about the world and generate tests for confirmation. If we wish to confirm the 
proposition that “All bachelors are unhappy,” then we can easily imagine scenarios where the 
statement is put to the test. Through surveys or psychoanalysis, evidence gathered empirically to 
serve the ends of affirming (or disconfirming) our postulations about the world is taken to be a 
general fact about the nature of reality and the human condition. 
 That is not to say that the idea of empirical confirmation is free of philosophical problems 
itself. The subject of what counts as sufficient empirical confirmation is a heated issue with the 
realm of philosophy of science. The debate entails asking the question of “how do we know 
when evidence gives us a good reason to believe that something is true?” In other words, where 
do we draw the line between proven hypotheses satisfactory and ones that require more 
experimentation? Bayesianism is an approach to answering those questions. According to that 
doctrine, there is a theorem that calculates the probability of truth of the hypothesis. Evidence 
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plays into this, writes Peter Godfrey-Smith, “when there is an uncertainty about a hypothesis, 
observational evidence can sometimes raise or lower the probability of the hypothesis.”51 The 
relation between the Bayesian theorem and evidence is, when provided, can have a dramatic 
effect on the probability of said hypothesis. Note that this is in the positive or negative direction. 
For example, the hypothesis “All ravens are black” is given a higher probability for every 
instance of a black raven. A white raven, on the other hand, lowers said probability.  
 Peter Achinstein, on the other hand, offers an alternative view on evidence. He criticizes 
scientists for a weak determination of what counts as evidence. He believes modern scientists 
turned empirical evidence a priori with mathematical calculations, as with above. Achinstein 
then goes on to list off four different kinds of evidence that arise in experimentation and 
investigation and how all of those interact with one another in order to give scientists a good 
reason to believe that a hypothesis is true.52 
 Godfrey-Smith explains a view of scientific hypotheses that generates mathematical 
probabilities to deem said hypotheses true or not. Achinstein opposes such an a priori conception 
in favor of a theory where all forms of evidence are taken into consideration. More importantly, 
said evidence is not abstracted into a formula. Regardless of one's stance, it is to be noted how 
both of these writers treat the concept of empirical conformation. Neither doubts that such a thing 
is possible. For if that were the case, then talk of what evidence counts as strengthening a theory 
or what evidence should taken into serious consideration would be futile. Instead, both 
Achinstein and Godfrey-Smith assume that empirical confirmation is a true and present concept. 
Nowhere in their writing does the question “can empirical confirmation even be possible?” 
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arise.53 
 What was intended from this section is to demonstrate how, when discussing matters 
regarding empirical confirmation, the subject is always taken as a given and is rarely questioned. 
Questions of empirical confirmation are always asking how it is possible and to what degree it is 
successful, never if it is possible. Again, this relates back to Quine's treatment of concepts like 
cognitive synonym. He immediately starts asking the if question and never really goes into the 
how question as a result.  
 From what has been gather, we have an answer to why it is that philosophers have not 
touched syntheticity in light of the “Two Dogmas.” At its base is a notion so fundamental to 
science and day-to-day human life that there is no need to question if it is possible at all. Seeing 
that, philosophers directed their attention to analyticity only. That seems like a fair assessment; 
analyticity is more problematic of the analytic/synthetic division. There, clearly, are philosophers 
probing the bases of analyticity and asking if the foundations are grounded, which is not the case 
with syntheticity. 
 This begs the question: if syntheticity is a stable concept with empirical confirmation, 
why is that not being brought up in discussions about the division? The attacks and criticisms 
that followed Quine's “Two Dogmas” never shed any light on syntheticity. Yet it appears to be a 
solid idea insofar as its basis of empirical confirmation is generally accepted as being a fact. 
Thus, if we take Quine to be right about analyticity, there is a one-sided fight going on. With 
philosophers bickering over analyticity, syntheticity remains strong. How effective philosophical 
                                                 
53 Hume's induction fallacy might be brought up as a counter-point. The induction fallacy states, to put it loosely, no 
matter how consistently an event occurs, that is not sufficient grounds to say that it will happen again at another 
given point. Though the sun has risen everyday of my life, Hume believes that I cannot justify my belief that it 
will rise again tomorrow off of that. This concern, however, can be brushed aside. Not only does science function 
just fine in light of this, but what Hume's fallacy says is that we cannot prove that something will happen again. 
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investigations into the distinction can be when only one side is being critiqued?  
 
Conclusion 
 Three dogmas of Quine’s essay have been exposed. Firstly, there is the adherence to 
specific premises of which their truth is challenged and only attracts certain kinds of 
philosophers. Second, there is the dogmatism of blindly accepting the possibility of naturally 
analytic statements being rooted in the logical form whilst ignoring conflicting internal 
philosophical issues. And finally, the third dogma is the avoidance of syntheticity: a concept 
generally accepted as true by the greater community of philosophers. Perhaps in the future more 
works will arrive on the scene to deliver a deathblow to the analytic/synthetic distinction. Before 
the division is attacked again, however, these issues must be solved. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Yet what we are talking about here is actually about evidence in favor of confirming a hypothesis.  
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